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Abstract
We treat fiscal equalisation as an insurance device against regional
tax revenue variance. This insurance comes at the price of a moral
hazard: regional government will spend too little effort on the
development of the local tax base. In a simple bargaining model with
two identical regions we show that less than total fiscal equalisation
combined with lump sum transfers will be optimal. Taking a step
back to the constitutional bargaining behind some veil of ignorance
which determines the fallback position for later negotiations, we
show that writing total fiscal equalisation into the constitution will be
optimal.
Keywords:  Fiscal equalisation, constitutional bargaining, moral
hazard













Levels of fiscal equalisation with respect to tax revenues between the  Länder in
Germany are very high. This has sparked a debate about the future of fiscal
equalisation in Germany. In a recent decision, the German constitutional court ruled
that the current system of fiscal equalisation needs to be changed by 2003. Against
this background, the question of the optimal fiscal equalisation is a timely issue.
In many federal countries
1 the fiscal equalisation programme aims to equalise
differences in tax revenue by reducing the gap between the actual tax revenues of a
state and the per capita tax revenue average across all states. In order to give a rough
idea of the current arrangements in Germany to assess the relevance of our
considerations, we compare tax revenues before and after equalisation for the Länder
in Germany in 1996 in figure 1. We find that the tax revenues per capita in each state
(Bundesland) are almost levelled to the average of all Länder.
Insert Figure 1
Figure 1 shows that since the pre-equalisation/post-equalisation slope is even
negative, we have a reversed ranking of the states measured by the amount of their tax
revenues. This explains the current discontentment with the German system. The high
degree of fiscal equalisation in Germany implies a high implicit marginal tax on tax
revenues because higher tax revenues in a state reduce the amount of equalising
transfers received by this state (or increase the transfers to be paid to poorer states). In
the German federal system, tax rates and the definition of tax bases are uniform across3
states because they are determined by federal law. While states are not able to levy
taxes independently, they are nevertheless responsible for collecting taxes. Thus, the
implicit taxes in this equalisation system mainly affect the effort of the state
governments to collect taxes enforcing the tax code. Standard economic theory
suggests that the higher the marginal implicit tax on tax revenue is the lower the
state's level of tax enforcement and, hence, tax revenue will be.
Huber and Lichtblau (1997) calculated the size of the implicit tax rate for different
states due to fiscal equalisation. They found that in Germany a gross increase in tax
revenues by DM 1 million leads to net (post fiscal equalisation) increases in
disposable tax revenues of anything between 100 000 DM and 300 000 DM. This
translates into implicit marginal tax rates between 70 and 90 percent
2. Baretti, Huber
and Lichtblau (2000) analysed the distortion induced by these implicit tax rates on the
fiscal decisions of the states, i.e. tax enforcement. Since tax rates are set uniformly by
the federal government,  tax enforcement is measured as the ratio between tax
revenues and the gross domestic product in the states. The authors estimate that the
implicit tax rate due to fiscal equalisation reduces total German tax revenues by up to
10 percent. This indicates that the fiscal equalisation system significantly distorts the
states' fiscal decisions on tax enforcement. As a consequence, there is an increasing
number of authors calling for a reduction in the level of fiscal equalisation in
Germany
3.
                                                                                                                                           
1  Fiscal  equalisation of tax  revenues  takes  place in,  for  instance,  Australia, Canada,  Denmark,
Germany, Switzerland.
2 Figure one suggests implicit tax rates even above 100 percent. This discrepancy is due to additional
federal transfers ("Bundesergänzungszugweisung") that Huber and Lichtblau (1999) do not take into
account in their study of fiscal equalisation in the stricter sense ("Länderfinanzausgleich").
3 See Leibfritz et al. (2000), a report of the Ifo Institute, Munich, for the federal ministry of finance or
Vesper (2000).4
The issue of fiscal equalisation is also highly relevant in a European context. For a
long time, the European Union has had a system of fiscal transfers with clear net
contributors and net recipients. But what is still lacking are fair and binding rules that
formalise the system of fiscal equalisation on a European level. These rules will need
to take into account the positive insurance as well as the negative incentive effects of
fiscal equalisation which is a system of "bail out" of some sort. If and when Europe
moves towards closer political integration, a European constitution will have to be
agree upon which lays down, amongst others, the rules of fiscal equalisation to be
used between member states.
The theoretical analysis of the Canadian equalisation system by Smart and Bird
(1996) and Smart (1998) suggests that equalising federal transfers distorts the tax
policy incentives of  subnational governments. By raising the tax rates applied to
elastic tax bases, provinces can depress the base. Because the fiscal transfers in
Canada are inversely related to the tax base and not to tax revenues, provinces have an
incentive to depress the tax base with excessively high tax rate. This equalisation
system differs from the one analysed in our paper both because in Canada provinces
have the autonomy to levy tax rates independently and because in Germany fiscal
equalisation only depends on tax revenues and not on the tax base.
The basic set-up of Lockwood (1999) is more similar to our model, but his focus is on
public goods provision whereas we concentrate on the moral hazard incentives
induced by insurance against tax revenue shocks.
Our paper now splits the question of fiscal equalisation into two separate issues.
Firstly, we use a simple model to calculate an optimal bargaining solution for the5
problem of fiscal equalisation for given fallback positions. The model is based on two
identical countries with identical bargaining strength and a standard exponential risk-
utility function negotiating with each other. We obtain the usual insurance result: less
than total fiscal equalisation combined with lump sum transfers will be optimal.
Secondly, we look at the preceding constitutional process behind some veil of
ignorance which determines the fallback position in post-constitutional negotiations.
Here we get the result that  total  fiscal equalisation should be written into the
constitution. This total equalisation can be interpreted as an insurance against
uncertain lump sum transfers.
Thus, our answer to the problem of fiscal equalisation is twofold. Firstly, a high level
of fiscal equalisation at the constitutional level is desirable. Secondly, this
constitutional rule should not be implemented in practice but should only be used as
the fallback position on the basis of which lower levels of fiscal equalisation with
compensating lump sum transfers will be negotiated.
The Model
We consider a fiscal equalisation system in an economy with two states. Each state
has an uncertain tax revenue due to regional economic uncertainty. Bureaucrats and
politicians are risk averse with respect to this uncertainty as d escribed by the
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States can increase their tax revenue by fostering the tax base in their respective area.
Thus, the effort of the local policy to build and strengthen the tax sources determines
the tax revenues.
1. We assume that the fostering of tax sources creates effort costs. We









Fiscal equalisation means that each state keeps a proportion of its tax revenues and
redistributes the remaining part of the tax revenues to the other states. In a two-state
economy after fiscal equalisation, the net revenue of state 1 is given by a proportion
of its own tax revenues, the reverse proportion of its neighbours tax revenues minus
the effort costs due to the enforcement of tax sources:7
(5)
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where  i e ~  is a normally distributed random variable denoting the stochastic shock
affecting state  i's income:  ) , ( ~ ~ 2
i i i N s m e .  i e  denotes the fiscal  state´s effort to
enforce tax sources and  a denotes the degree of smoothing regional tax revenue
shocks. Because of our symmetry assumption, analogous equations for state 2 can
always be obtained by interchanging the indices 1 and 2 throughout this paper. For a
given degree of equalisation state 1's decision problem is:
(6)
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The first-order condition yields the optimal level of effort for state 1:









When choosing  a there is a trade-off between incentive compatibility and insurance
against tax revenue shocks. Optimal incentives to foster the bureaucratic effort are set
by  1 = a , which means that every state can keep its full tax revenues and
redistribution between the states is realised by lump-sum transfers. However,  1 = a
implies no insurance at all. Only for  1 < a  there is insurance. Hence: the higher the
risk aversion of the states, the smaller the optimal degree of fiscal equalisation. High
                                                                                                                                           
1 In Germany such a type of policy is called “Standortpolitik”.8
risk aversion makes fiscal equalisation attractive as a means of diversifying the risk of
uncertain tax revenues.
Round table negotiation
We consider a round-table negotiation between the two states and derive the indirect
utility function of state 1 by inserting the optimal level of effort from equation (7) into
the utility function in (6):
(8)  )
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Now, let the states negotiate on the degree of equalisation. Assuming Nash bargaining
with equal bargaining power for both states, they maximise joint welfare by choosing
an optimal level of fiscal equalisation. They then distribute the resulting surplus
equally with respect to their fallback positions by choosing appropriate lump-sum
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The optimal degree of equalisation maximising the joint utility of both states in a
fiscal equalisation system is given by (note that  0 2 1 = +T T ):
(10)
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Obviously, if the states are risk-neutral  ) 2 , 1 , 0 ( = = i ri  it is optimal not to have fiscal
equalisation at all and only redistribution via lump-sum transfers instead. In this case,
the trade-off between incentive compatibility and insurance vanishes and the optimal
welfare is only affected by incentives that induce the highest effort by the states. In
the case of risk aversion  ) 2 , 1 , 0 ( = > i ri , the optimal degree of fiscal equalisation will
be  1
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) ( 2 1 r r =  the optimal degree of equalisation will be  2 / 1 1
* > a > . This means that each
state will have to give up less than half of its tax revenues if it wants to be insured
optimally against tax revenue shocks. Fiscal equalisation will typically be less than
complete. Less than complete insurance in the presence of moral hazard is a standard
result from insurance theory.
The welfare gain made by replacing a non-optimal level of fiscal equalisation  a by
* a  is given by:
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Due to Nash bargaining with equal bargaining strength, this surplus is distributed
equally with respect to the fallback position and hence:10
(13)  2 , 1 ,
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With equations (12) and (13) the level of lump-sum transfers can be deduced:
(14)
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Inserting  ) , (
*
1 a a T  in (9) yields the utility of state 1 depending on the initial and the
optimal degree of equalisation:
(15)
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In this section we have demonstrated that it is generally welfare improving to engage
in the round table negotiation and that the optimal level of fiscal equalisation as given
in (11) does not depend on the level of fiscal equalisation given in the constitution.11
Optimal Constitution
Solving the negotiation game backwards, we now examine at the constitutional
problem. We place ourselves behind a veil of ignorance by assuming that at the
constitutional stage  i m , the expected value at the post-constitutional stage, is
uncertain behind the veil of ignorance and has variance  i m var . In this situation the
two countries negotiate their respective fallback positions to be written into the
constitution. In the previous section we have shown that post-constitutional
negotiations yield a level of fiscal equalisation * a  that is independent of the fallback
position. Only the lump-sum transfers depend on the fallback. Behind the veil of
ignorance, these lump-sum transfers themselves become risky. The optimal default
fiscal equalisation  * * a to be written into the constitution now tries to deal with that
risk efficiently.
We assume that  1 m  and  2 m  are uncorrelated and normally distributed behind the veil
of ignorance. The sum of expected utilities at the constitutional level is therefore
given by:
(16)
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Maximising this expression, tedious calculations on the basis of the first-order
condition yield the optimal level of fiscal equalisation:12
(17)
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With identical attitudes to risk ( 2 1 r r = ) or identical risk ( 2 1 m m Var Var = ), complete
fiscal equalisation should be written into the constitution:
(18) 2 / 1
* * = a
The intuition for this runs as follows: the effort levels are not affected by the
constitution since they are only affected by the post-constitutional 
* a  which is
independent of the constitution. The constitutional 
* * a  only determines the transfer
payments resulting from the post-constitutional negotiation. Ex-ante, these transfer
payments are risky. From equation (15) we can see that this risk ultimately due to ex-
ante risk in  1 m  and  2 m  is best diversified (at no effort distortion cost) with  5 . 0 * * = a .
This completes the argument that there is not one but two levels of optimal fiscal
equalisation: a high level of fiscal equalisation written into the constitution and a
lower one to be negotiated in the post-constitutional stage.
Conclusion
This paper suggests that simply lowering the degree of fiscal equalisation might be
too simplistic a cure to the incentive problem posed by the Länderfinanzausgleich in
Germany today. At the same time as lowering the degree of year by year fiscal13
equalisation, writing total fiscal equalisation ( 2 / 1
* * = a ) into the constitution as a fall
back position ought to be considered on the basis of this model.14
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Figure 1:
Degree of Equalisation in Germany 1996
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Data description: cross-section data of per capita tax revenues of the Länder (without city states) in
Germany in the year 1996 before and after fiscal equalisation. Source: Huber/Lichtblau (1997).
The Sarre is an outlier with post-equalisation level above 120 due to exceptional bail-out payments